Rights (op-icescr)4 and the un Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;5 at unesco level, the Declaration on Cultural Diversity6 and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.7
All these instruments attempt to substantiate and build up a new approach to human rights, calling for a reevaluation of some of their fundamental principles, such as, for instance, the value of individual autonomy-reflected in the liberal, individualistic orientation of the great majority of treaties on human rights-or the one of "internal" self-determination.
One of these developments was also aimed at establishing a distinct legal right, namely the right to cultural identity.8 The existence and the legal consecration of such a right represents a real challenge, at least from two points of view: firstly, translating culture into legal terms or conceptualizing a right that relates to culture and secondly, taking due account of the collective dimension such a right entails. The latter aspect makes it rather "dangerous" in the eyes of states, which are concerned about the impact of such an approach on the exercise of their traditional functions. The difficulties and the implications of the encounter between culture and law have been illustrated by professor Emmanuel Decaux, from whom we quote: "descended from the absolute sphere of art, culture enters legal relativism and the logics of conciliating the private and the general interest".9
This chapter will be structured in the following manner: firstly, the theoretical resources, which might lie the foundations of a distinct subjective right to cultural identity and the arguments/advantages supporting its legal consecration, will be discussed; it will also be pointed out the disadvantages and the practical consequences or difficulties that such a demarche entails (Section 2). , volume 22, 1993, p. 196. 
